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Unlawful Arrests and Over-Detention of
America's Immigrants: What the Federal
Government Can Do to Eliminate
State and Local Abuse of
Immigration Detainers
MOLLY F. FRANCK*

Introduction
Marcotulio Mendez was a twenty-eight year-old Latino male
One day while
who lived in Palm Beach County, Florida.'
Marcotulio was driving home, a police officer from the Sheriff's
Office began discretely following him, just a few blocks before
Marcotulio reached his residence. 2 Once Marcotulio exited the car
and entered his yard, the officer turned on his police car lights and
drew his gun on Marcotulio. 3 Marcotulio immediately put his hands
in the air and told the officer that he had done nothing wrong.4 In
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1. Fla. Immigrant Coal. v. Mendez, No. 09-81280-CIV-MARRA, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52473, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *3.
4. Id.
[55]
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front of witnesses, the officer grabbed Marcotulio by the collar,
pushed him to the ground, and handcuffed him.5 The officer
proceeded to drag Marcotulio, face down, to the street.6
Marcotulio was arrested on May 14, 2009, and taken to the Palm
Beach County Jail. 7 He was charged with a nonmoving violation,
driving without a license, and resisting arrest with violence.8 That
same day, a state court judge set bond at $3,000 and Marcotulio's
pastor came to the jail to post the bond.9 However, a member of the
Sheriff's Office told the pastor that "the bond would not be accepted
because an Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detainer
had been issued."10 The official did not explain that, according to
the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") regulations, once
bond is offered and posted, the ICE detainer only lasts for 48 hours."
After 48 hours, Marcotulio should have been released from jail unless
ICE obtained a warrant for his arrest and took him into custody.12
As a result, Marcotulio was unlawfully prevented from posting
bond and kept in jail for over five months until ICE took him into
custody on October 21, 2009.13
Marcotulio was subsequently
released on bond set by an immigration judge on November 5,
2009.14
Sadly, Marcotulio's experience is not unusual. Recently, a
lawsuit was filed on February 2, 2011, against the Orleans Parish
Sheriff's Office in Louisiana on behalf of two men unlawfully held
on immigration detainers for 91 and 164 days respectively.1 5
5. Mendez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52473, at *3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. On June 15, 2009, the charges were amended to "fleeing and eluding, resisting
arrest without violence (emphasis added) and driving without a license." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *34. On July 25, 2009, Pastor Lopez again attempted to post bond for
Marcotulio. Id. However, he was told that, "if he posted bond for Mr. Mendez, he
would not only risk not getting his money back, but Mr. Mendez would not be released
from jail as he would have an immigration hold." Id.
11. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011) ("Upon a determination by the Department to issue a
detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency
shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit the assumption of custody by the
department.").
12. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (2011). While ICE can issue a detainer under
8 U.S.C. § 1357 without articulating any degree of suspicion, ICE must have "reason to
believe" the detainee is in violation of U.S. immigration laws and subject to removal
before taking him into custody. Id.
13. Mendez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52473, at *5.
14. Id.
15. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint at 2-3, Cacho v. Gusman, No. 2:11-cv-00225 (E.D.
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Although the 48-hour rule limits the authority of state and local law
enforcement agencies ("LEAs") to keep an individual in jail once
their traffic, municipal and/or state criminal charges have been
resolved, 1 6 many of the LEAs do not abide by the rule.' 7
Furthermore, at least one county has tried to argue that the law did
not "clearly establish" that the local sheriff's office must have an
independent criminal basis to arrest an alien before taking him to jail
and contacting ICE to issue an immigration hold. 18 As a result,
immigrants (or individuals who look like immigrants) are
increasingly at risk of being unlawfully arrested, detained, and
denied their right to due process. 19 State and local authorities are
using the issuance of ICE detainers as retroactive justification for the
initial arrest or for the continued detention of a non-citizen for days,
weeks, or months after the individual's required release. 20
This note focuses on the increasing number of cases that
indicate state and local LEAs are systematically violating the due
process rights of noncitizens through abuse of immigration
detainers. Part I discusses federal preemption and the limits on
"inherent authority" of state and local police to enforce federal
immigration laws absent express agreements with ICE. It briefly
summarizes the three principal mechanisms used by the federal
government to permit state and local police involvement in this area.
Part II describes how state and local police are abusing immigration
detainers by using detainers to justify unlawful arrests and overdetention of individuals in their custody. Part III recognizes ICE's
attempt to modify its immigration detainer policy in light of these
harms, but concludes that proposed reforms to the agency's new

La. Feb. 2, 2011), available at http:// www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/Cacho-vGusman-complaint.pdf.
16. Id. at 10.
17. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, COMMENTS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUsTOMs ENFORCEMENT DRAFT DETAINER POLICY (2010) [hereinafter NGO DETAINER
COMMENTS], available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/
lac/NGO-DetainerCommentsFinal-10-1-2010.pdf. At least eight lawsuits were filed in
federal district courts across the country between September 2008 and August 2010
against local Sheriff's offices for keeping individuals in jail on immigration detainers in
excess of the 48-hour rule. Id. app. at 1-3.
18. Comm. for Immigrant Rights v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2010).
19. Fla. Immigrant Coal. v. Mendez, No. 09-81280-CIV-MARRA, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114726, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2010) ("Daniel Cohen, an assistant public
defender in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit has filed about 13 or 14 habeas petitions
regarding ICE holds.... In addition, defendant's counsel has stipulated that 17 writs of
habeas petitions were filed against the Sheriff.").
20. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17.
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draft detainer policy are not sufficient to adequately address the
problem. Part IV concludes that the distinct harms perpetrated by
LEAs are, in part, a failure of Congress to properly address these
issues in the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1357, which allows state and local
LEAs to assist ICE in the issuance and execution of immigration
detainers without express cooperation agreements. As a result, these
LEAs are not official "immigration officers" who are bound by DHS
regulations or ICE policies that set the standards for immigration
enforcement activities and guard against abuse. Ultimately, this
note proposes that Congress has a compelling interest to deter police
misconduct by making DHS regulations and ICE policies binding on
all LEAs who willingly execute immigration detainers.

I. Role of State and Local Police in the Realm of
Immigration Enforcement
A. Federal Preemption and the Limits of "Inherent Authority"
Ever since Arizona governor, Janice Brewer, signed S.B. 107021
into law in early 2010, national debates over immigration have
dominated the public discourse and precipitated a tidal wave of
state legislative proposals to give states authority to regulate
immigration. 22 While this note does not discuss the legal issues
raised by states enacting their own immigration-related laws, it does
begin by underscoring the legal principle affirmed in U.S. v. Arizona
that "the power to regulate immigration is vested exclusively in the
federal government." 23 Even though the Constitution's explicit
textual authority for federal immigration power may appear to rest
solely on the Naturalization Clause, 24 the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that the federal government's dominion over
immigration is "supported by both enumerated and implied

21. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 113.
22. Silvia Otero & Ver6nica Rosas, Mds Estados Replican Ley Contra Indocumentados,
EL UNIVERSAL (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/ nacion/182809.html.
The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) registered eight initiatives similar to
S.B. 1070 presented in 2010 by the following states: Missouri, South Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Kansas, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Michigan, and Texas. Id. As of the time
this newspaper article was written, seven more states (Colorado, Indiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Ohio) were in the process of formulating similar bills.
Id.
23. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 n.4 (D. Ariz. 2010).
24. Anne B. Chandler, Why is the Policeman Asking for My Visa? The Future of Federalism and Immigration Enforcement, 15 TULSA J.COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 210 (2008).
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constitutional powers" 25 including its "authority over foreign
affairs." 26
Nevertheless, the federal government has, in limited
circumstances, granted state and local LEAs prescribed authority to
assist with civil immigration enforcement through the so-called
"2 8 7 (g) agreements." 27 Furthermore, courts have recognized LEA's
inherent authority to make arrests for criminal violations of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").28 The INA, also known as
the McCarran-Walter Act, is the nation's complex body of
immigration laws. 29 The INA, comprised of both criminal and civil
provisions, establishes the rules for admission, deportation,
continued lawful presence and naturalization of noncitizens.3 0
After the Ninth Circuit's widely adopted 1983 decision in
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, state and local LEAs were acknowledged to
have inherent authority to police criminal, but not civil, violations of
the INA.31 Criminal violations of the INA include the transporting
of unauthorized aliens into or within the United States (alien
smuggling),32 entry into the United States after being formally
removed or ordered deported (criminal reentry),33 and illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance (drug trafficking).34 The court
concluded that state and local enforcement of criminal provisions of
the INA did not inherently conflict with federal interests, provided
that individuals were stopped only when the officer had reasonable
suspicion of a state law violation, and arrested only when the officer
had probable cause that a criminal provision of the INA had been
violated.3 5 By contrast, the court held that "the civil provisions of

25. Arizona, 703 F. Supp .2d at 991. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 706 (1893), and Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889), for
previous Supreme Court decisions citing the principle.
26. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41423,
AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 1 n.1
(2010).

27. Immigration and Nationality Act § 2 87 g, 8 U.S.C. § 135 7 (g) (2011). Will be discussed more in depth in the next section.
28. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983). See also United States
v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2008).
29. McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (commonly known
as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)); RICHARD BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY LAWS 3 n.2 (4th ed. 2010).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474-75.
Id. at 476.
See INA § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2011).
See INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2011).
See INA § 101(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2011).
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 477 ("We further emphasize that arrests for federal offenses
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the Act.. . constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme as to be
consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration." 36
The court noted that although entering the U.S. without inspection
(illegal border crossing)37 is a misdemeanor, simply being in the U.S.
without permission (unlawful presence) is a civil offense.38 There are
many reasons why a person could be unlawfully present in the
United States including "expiration of a visitor's visa, change of
student status, or acquisition of prohibited employment." 39 Thus,
the court concluded that "an arresting officer cannot assume that an
alien who admits he lacks proper documentation has violated
section 1325" and made an illegal entry into the U.S.40
Not surprisingly, a sharp debate has since emerged about
whether state and local LEAs, absent express federal agreements,
have inherent authority to investigate both criminal and civil
violations of the INA.41 One of the strongest proponents of the claim
that local police have inherent authority to investigate, arrest, and
detain for civil immigration violations is Kris Kobach, a principal
drafter of S.B. 1070.42 Mr. Kobach and others, including U.S.
Republican Senator of Alabama, Jeff Sessions, base their argument
on three Tenth Circuit decisions issued between 1984 and 2001, and
on an unpublished opinion authored by the Office of Legal Council
("OLC") in 2002 under the Bush Administration. 43
The Tenth Circuit decisions, United States v. Salinas-Calderon,44

can be justified by state law authorization only if the arrest procedures do not violate the
federal constitution."(citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963))).
36. Id. at 474-75.
37. INA

§ 275,

8 U.S.C.

§ 1325 (2011);

United States v. Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F.2d 1192,

1193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 3282, criminal prosecution for
§ 1325 is barred after five years because the offense is "consummated at the time of entry" and is not a continuing offense).
38. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476.
39. Id.
40. Id.

41. See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
965 (2004) (arguing against inherent authority to enforce civil violations of the INA); Kris
W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005) (arguing for inherent authority to enforce
civil violations of the INA).
42. Alia Beard Rau, Arizona Immigration Law Was Crafted by Activist, THE ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (May 31, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/
2010/05/31/20100531arizona-immigration-law-kris-kobach.html.

43. Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, Symposium: Globalization, Security & Human
Rights: Immigration in the Twenty-First Century: The Growing Role for State and Local Law
Enforcement in the Realm of ImmigrationLaw, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV 323, 334-37 (2005).

44. United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984).
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United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 45 and United States v. SantanaGarcia,46 are cited collectively for the principle that state and local
police have inherent authority to enforce federal immigration law,
without distinguishing between criminal and civil offenses.47
However, in all three cases, the defendants were stopped for
allegedly violating state traffic laws and were subsequently arrested
because the officer had probable cause that the defendant was
engaged in alien smuggling, criminal reentry or drug-trafficking. 48
In none of these cases did the officer admit to stopping the vehicle
solely to verify the occupants' civil immigration status. 49 Therefore,
it is difficult to argue that these arrests upheld by the Tenth Circuit
actually provide support for an inherent authority to police civil
immigration violations, given the independent criminal grounds that
existed in each case.50 As one legal scholar has previously argued,
giving local police inherent authority to enforce both civil and
criminal immigration violations would be like requiring an officer
who responds to a domestic violence call to make sure that all
parties involved have paid their income taxes or maintained
compulsory liability insurance on their vehicles. 51
Apart from the Tenth Circuit decisions, Senator Sessions and his
ilk have also relied on the 2002 OLC Opinion to support the notion
that "federal law did not preempt state police from arresting aliens
on the basis of civil deportability."5 2 Since 1978, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") has published various OLC opinions to reflect the
executive branch's evolving views concerning the limitations on
state and local LEAs in immigration enforcement.5 3 In 1983,

45. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
46. United States v. Santana Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2001).
47. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 26, at 15 n.80 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 13-14. Defendant Salinas-Calderon was stopped for driving erratically and
arrested for alien smuggling when the officer found six people in the back of truck, none
of whom spoke English or carried documentation. Id. at 13. Vasquez-Alvarez was
stopped on suspicion of drug trafficking and arrested after admitting that he had a
felony record and had been previously deported from the United States. Id. SantanaGarcia was stopped by a Utah state trooper for an alleged traffic violation and was
arrested after consenting to a vehicle search that turned up illegal drugs. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 15 n.80.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Chandler, supra note 24, at 230.
52. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 26, at 16 [hereinafter 2002 OLC Opinion] (quoting
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General on the Non-preemption of
the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 8 (Apr. 3, 2002)), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/
OLCOpinion 2002.pdf?doclD=1041).
53. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 26, at 15.
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following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gonzales, the DOJ began to
encourage greater involvement by LEAs in immigration
enforcement, "but emphasized that federal authorities 'remain
responsible for all arrests for [civil] immigration violations."' 54 Then,
in 1996, the OLC affirmed that "state and local police lack
recognized legal authority to stop and detain an alien solely on
suspicion of civil deportability."5 5 However, the OLC issued a new,
unpublished 56 memorandum in 2002 that suddenly reversed its line
of previous opinions on the subject.5 7 The 2002 OLC Opinion
claimed that the statements made in Gonzales about federal
preemption of the INA's civil provisions were merely dictum,
choosing instead to favor the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of
inherent authority.58
While the Obama Administration has yet to formally rescind the
2002 OLC Opinion, the DOJ's direct challenge to S.B. 1070 clearly
disavows the notion that LEAs have inherent authority to police civil
violations of immigration law absent federal agreements. The Sixth
Circuit concurred in a 2008 decision, United States v. Urrieta,59 when
it found that a local police officer did not have authority to detain
the petitioner beyond the period necessary to issue him a traffic
citation in order to determine if he was an unlawfully present alien.60
The court held that "local law enforcement officers cannot enforce
completed violations of civil immigration law (i.e., illegal presence)
unless specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney General
under special conditions that are not applicable in the present
case." 61 Thus, the overriding conclusion is that states and local
authorities do not possess inherent authority to enforce civil immigration
violations without express authorization by the federal government.

54. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Press Release, Department of Justice (Feb. 10, 1983), in
INTERPRETER RELEASES VOL. 60 NO. 9, at 172-173 (Mar. 4, 1983)).

55. Id. at 16 (quoting Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal
Aliens, 20 Op. O.L.C. 26 (1996)).
56. Id. at 16 n.90 (the DOJ did not make the 2002 OLC Opinion publicly available
until several groups sued under the Freedom of Information Act and the DOJ was required to release a redacted version by an order from the Second Circuit in 2005).
57. Id. at 15-16.
58. Id. at 17.
59. United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2008).
60. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 26, at 12.

61. Id. (quoting Urrieta, 520 F.3d at 574).
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II. How State and Local Police Cooperate with ICE:
287(g) Agreements, Secure Communities and
the Criminal Alien Program
A. 287(g) Agreements
Although state and local LEAs do not have inherent authority to
police civil immigration violations, in 1996, Congress chose to
amend statute 8 U.S.C. § 1357 by adding section (g) - Performance of
immigration officer functions by State officers and employees, to give
federal immigration officials the power to deputize state officers in
immigration enforcement. 62 These deputy partnerships, known as
"287(g) agreements" or "Memorandums of Agreement" ("MOAs"),
grant local entities the power to enforce immigration law within
their jurisdictions. 63 Officers trained under the 287(g) program are
authorized to carry out the functions normally reserved for federal
immigration officials and do so at the expense of their local
jurisdictions.6 4 As of September 2, 2011, ICE had signed MOAs with
sixty-nine different LEAs in twenty-four states.6 5 However, the first
two agreements were not made until 2002 and 2003, with eightyeight percent of agreements signed between 2007 and 2010.66
Consequently, MOAs are considered a relatively new phenomenon
and have been the subject of many law review articles in recent
years. 67 Of particular concern to legal scholars is whether the 287(g)
training is adequate to prevent racial profiling and civil rights

62. INA § 2 8 7 (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2011).
63. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Fact Sheet: Delegation of
Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, http://www.
ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter 287g
Fact Sheet].
64. INA § 28 7(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(1) (2011).
65. 287g Fact Sheet, supra note 63.
66. Id. The first agreements were signed by the Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement,
July 2, 2002 and the Alabama Department of Public Safety, September 10, 2003. Id. Only
eight of the sixty-nine agreements were signed before 2007. Id.
67. See Carrie L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local
Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113 (2007); Christine
Hobbs, Comment, State-Federal Partnershipsin Immigration Enforcement: Is the Trend Right
for Texas?, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 141 (2007); Jason G. Idilbi, Recent Development: Local
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: Should North Carolina Communities Implement
287(g) Authority?, 86 N.C.L. REV. 1710 (2008); Adam Blank, Survey and Article on Florida
Law: The Immigration Enforcement Multiplier: Examination of INA Section 287(g) in Light of
Florida'sMemorandum of Understanding,34 NOVA L. REV. 219 (2009).
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violations in immigration enforcement, practices which the agency
explicitly condemns. 68 Critics have sharply pointed out that while
ICE officers must attend seventeen weeks of basic training (plus
additional on-the-job field training), the ICE training course for
MOA officers lasts only four weeks. 69 The other major concern about
MOAs is that they create distrust of local police and strongly
discourage immigrants from reporting crimes that they witness or
personally experience. 70 In fact, over 100 cities and towns across the
U.S. (known as "sanctuary cities") have made it a policy not to allow
municipal resources to be used for immigration enforcement and do
not inquire about an individual's immigration status when enforcing
local laws.71 Consequently, the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP) has not adopted an official position to endorse MOAs,
given the widespread disagreement among members of law
enforcement about whether they should be involved in civil
immigration matters. 72
B. Secure Communities
Aside from deputizing local police officers with the power to
directly enforce immigration laws under 2 8 7 (g), DHS has found
other ways to establish cooperation between ICE and local LEAs. In
March 2008, DHS announced its latest effort to identify "criminal
aliens" through the Secure Communities program.73
Secure
Communities (often referred to as "S-Comm" by non-DHS officials)
is new technology that links searches of the FBI fingerprint database
with DHS immigration records. 74 During the traditional booking
process, police will run a suspect's fingerprints through the FBI
database looking for previous arrest or conviction records. For
jurisdictions with S-Comm, that information is also cross-referenced

68. Arnold, supra note 67, at 116; see also ICE Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE's 287(g)
Program, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/news /library/
factsheets/287g-reform.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) [hereinafter 287g Update].
69. Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico, An Up-Close Perspective: The Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Laws by State and Local Police, 7 SEATILE J.Soc. JUST. 321, 326 (2008).
70. Arnold, supra note 67, at 122.
71. Steve Salvi, Sanctuary Cities: What Are They?, OHIO JOBS & JUST. PAC, http://
www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
72. Arnold, supra note 67, at 123.
73. Christopher N. Lasch, Immigration Law: Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers,35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173 (2008).
74. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://

www.ice.gov/secure-communities/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Secure Communities].
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with DHS immigration records.7 5 When DHS receives a "hit" from
fingerprints submitted through S-Comm, local ICE officers are
notified and decide if action is required. 76 Given the agency's
limited resources to pursue all of the country's immigration
violators, ICE claims to first prioritize the identification and removal
of dangerous criminal aliens convicted of violent felonies (murder,
rape, kidnapping) or who pose threats to national security. 7
However, many localities are concerned that even folks who are
arrested for minor offenses (including traffic violations) and never
criminally charged, are now brought to the attention of DHS
through S-Comm and deported. 78 According to ICE documents
obtained by the Center for Constitutional Rights through a FOIA
lawsuit, about twenty-six percent of individuals deported
nationwide under S-Comm were "non-criminals," and fifty-three
percent of those deported were arrested for "low-level" charges. 79
Furthermore, the documents show that "from October 2008 to
October 2009, nearly five percent of about 5880 identified as
'matches' under S-Comm are actually U.S. citizens."8 0
These startling findings have prompted three large counties, San
Francisco, California, Santa Clara, California, and Arlington,
Virginia, to request the ability to opt out and prevent fingerprints
taken by LEAs for criminal background checks from being shared
with ICE.8 1 They argue that S-Comm is not Congressionally
authorized and amounts to federal "commandeering" of local
officials and resources in violation of the Tenth Amendment's
protection of states' rights. 82 Anjali Bhargava, Deputy County
Counsel for Santa Clara, explains that Santa Clara County is home to
a diverse immigrant community, with approximately one out of
every three County residents born abroad. 83 Ms. Bhargava says that
75. Secure Communities, supra note 74.
76. Id.
77. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to all Immigration and Customs Enforcement Emps. (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter ICE Priorities], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/
110302washingtondc.pdf (stating the agency's priorities for apprehension, detention and
removal of aliens under all programs that were first published on June 30, 2010, and revised Mar. 2, 2011).
78. Connie Choi & Angela Chan, Saying No to ICE's S-Comm Program, ASIAN L.
CAUCUS (Nov. 9, 2010), http://arcof72.com/2010/11/09/saying-no-to-iceE2%80%99ssecure-communities-program/.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Anjali Bhargava, Deputy Cnty Counsel for Santa Clara County, Cal., at the U.C.
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Santa Clara County objects to the Secure Communities program
because it significantly hampers community policing and the ability
to establish trustworthy relationships in the community.8 4 She goes
on to state that "the best way to detect and prosecute crime is to
work with the community. However, if community members are
afraid to call the police or fire department for fear of getting
themselves (or others) civilly deported, police can no longer be
effective in local crime control."85
Meanwhile, the Obama
and
declared that all local
Administration has reaffirmed the policy
jurisdictions in the country will be required to implement S-Comm
by 2013.86
C. Criminal Alien Program and ICE Detainers
The third mechanism used by the federal government to
facilitate cooperation between state and local LEAs and ICE is the
Criminal Alien Program ("CAP").87 Like S-Comm, CAP also utilizes
technology to link LEA criminal background checks with DHS
immigration files. The main difference is that S-Comm relies on
biometric data (fingerprints) taken after a suspect has been arrested,
whereas CAP only uses a name and "numerical identifier"88 entered
into the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database often during an investigatory stop. 89 In addition, as part of CAP,
DHS regularly sends ICE agents to screen inmates at the local jails. 90
Beginning in 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(now "DHS") started entering sub-files of information into NCIC
about noncitizens previously charged with criminal violations of
immigration law. 91 However, in August 2003, Attorney General
Hastings College of the Law Panel: U.S. v. Arizona and the Rise of Local Immigration Policing (Nov. 15, 2010).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Julia Preston & Kirk Semple, Taking a Hard Line: Immigrants and Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A20.
87. ICE Criminal Alien Program Fact Sheet, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/cap.htm [hereinafter CAP
Sheet] (published on Nov. 19th, 2008 and revised on Mar. 29, 2011).
88. FBI Fact Sheet for NCIC, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (examples of numerical
identifiers include date of birth, social security number, driver's license number, vehicle
plate number, etc.), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm (last updated
June 2, 2008).
89. Id.
90. CAP Sheet, supra note 87 (these agents operate under a CAP project called Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)).
91. Backgrounder: Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police, NAT'L
IMMIGR. F., http://www.imnigrationforum.org/images/uploads/BackgrounderState
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Ashcroft announced that new categories for civil immigration
violators had been added to the database (without Congressional
approval), hopelessly blurring the distinction between criminal and
civil immigration enforcement. 92 In either case, when DHS learns
that a local LEA has arrested a noncitizen, ICE will usually issue an
immigration detainer. An immigration detainer (often referred to as
an "ICE detainer" or "ICE hold") is an official request from ICE to a
local LEA that the LEA notify ICE before releasing the noncitizen
from criminal custody. 93 The ICE detainer is issued by submitting a
Form 1-247 to the jail. The detainer authorizes the LEA to keep the
individual incarcerated for "a period not to exceed 48 hours"
(excluding weekends and holidays) after criminal charges have been
resolved. 94 The purpose of the detainer is to give ICE the
opportunity to assume custody of the individual during that 48-hour
period. 95 While the regulation permits an immigration officer
(including a police officer deputized under 2 8 7 (g)) to issue a detainer
"at any time," 96 ICE must have probable cause that the detainee is
deportable and secure an arrest warrant before taking the individual
into custody. 97 Immigration detainers are the "linchpin" of the
287(g), Secure Communities and Criminal Alien Program "which
increasingly intertwine the state criminal justice systems with federal
immigration enforcement." 98

III. Immigration Detainers: How State and Local Police
are Abusing Their Power
While immigration detainers are crucial to state and local
cooperation in federal immigration enforcement, they are quite
vulnerable to abuse. A recent surge of habeas petitions and federal
lawsuits against local authorities pursuant to ICE holds indicates
that state and local LEAs are systematically violating the dueprocess rights of noncitizens through abuse of immigration
detainers. At least eight federal lawsuits were filed between
LocalEnforcement.pdf (last updated Aug. 2007).
92. Parra-Chico, supra note 69, at 328.
93. INA § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2011); 8 C.F.R § 287.7 (2011).
94. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2011); 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011).
95. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011).
96. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2011).
97. Telephone Interview with Kate Desormeau, Staff Attorney, ACLU Immigrants'
Rights Project (Feb. 16, 2011). According to Desormeau, the "reason to believe" standard
stated in 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(i)-(ii) has been likened to a "probable cause" standard. Id.
98. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17.
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September 2008 and August 2010 against local Sheriff's offices for
keeping individuals in jail on immigration detainers in excess of the
48-hour rule, with new lawsuits still emerging. 99 Additionally, some
of the lawsuits allege that the arrests themselves were unlawful,
executed solely on the basis of suspected immigration status and
without proper authority. Two prime examples are the 2008
California case, Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v.
County of Sonoma 00 and the 2009 Florida case, Cote v. Lubins.101
A. Using Detainers to Justify an Unlawful Arrest
In the Sonoma case, three individual plaintiffs, all Hispanic,
were arrested at different times and booked into custody at the
Sonoma County jail without criminal charge.102 The first plaintiff,
Sanchez-Lopez, was a passenger in a vehicle pulled over for
displaying a "For Sale" sign in the car rear window. 103 Both the
driver and passenger were asked to identify themselves (although
California does not have a "stop and identify" statute) and SanchezLopez was ordered out of the car and subjected to a pat-down
search.104 The Sonoma County Sheriff's officer then confiscated
Sanchez-Lopez's wallet without having reasonable suspicion or
consent. 05 Next, Sanchez-Lopez was interrogated by an ICE agent at
the scene who searched his wallet (looking for proof of foreign
nationality) and then allowed Sanchez-Lopez to be arrested by the
Sonoma officer and taken into local custody. 106 Sanchez-Lopez spent

99. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Jimenez Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11cv5452 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2011), available
at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/inimigrantjustice.org/files/ Jimenez et al v
Napolitano et al final complaint.pdf; Amy Elmgren, Immigration Policy: ICE Detainers
Challenged By Law Suit, LATIN AMERICA NEWS DISPATCH (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://atindispatch.com/2011/10/17/immigration-policy-ice-detainers-challenged-bylawsuit/. Jimenez-Moreno, a U.S. citizen, has filed a class action lawsuit against ICE and
DHS for wrongfully issuing an immigration detainer against him. Id. Jimenez-Moreno
has spent seven months in jail awaiting drug charges - but could have been released on
pretrial bail, were it not for the invalid ICE hold. Id.
100. Comm. for Immigrant Rights v. Cnty. of Sonoma (Sonoma II), NO. C 08-4220 RS,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2010).
101. Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Cote v. Lubins, No. 5:09-cv-91Oc-10-GRJ (M.D. Fla. 2009) (dismissed as moot).
102. Comm. for Immigrant Rights v. Cnty. of Sonoma (Sonoma 1), 644 F. Supp. 2d
1177, 1185-86 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
103. Id. at 1188.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Sonoma 1,644 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.

Winter 2012]

UNLAWFUL ARRESTS AND OVER-DETENTION

69

four days in the County jail without criminal charge before he was
transferred to ICE custody. 0 7 At no time before he was turned over
to ICE was Sanchez-Lopez notified of any charges against him,
informed of his right to a hearing or bond determination, examined
by a neutral magistrate or non-arresting immigration officer,
provided with a list of legal services, or informed that any
statements he made could be used against him in removal
proceedings. 08
Although the ICE agent and Sonoma officer were conducting a
joint patrol, the Sonoma County Sheriff's Office is not a participant
in the 2 8 7 (g) program, and thus does not have authority to stop,
detain or arrest an individual for suspicion of unlawful presence.109
Furthermore, given the facts of this scenario, the ICE agent also
lacked proper authority to question and detain Sanchez-Lopez. DHS
regulations state that "an immigration officer, like any other person,
has the right to ask questions of anyone as long as the immigration
officer does not restrain the freedom of an individual, not under arrest, to
walk away.""o In this case, the immigration officer had restrained
Sanchez-Lopez's freedom to walk away by first seizing the wallet
that the Sonoma officer had confiscated from Sanchez-Lopez without
his permission. Also, it would seem that Sanchez-Lopez was not
free to leave given that his driver was still with the Sonoma officer
who had pulled them over. In addition, the ICE agent lacked
"reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that [SanchezLopez was] an alien illegally in the United States ... [in order to]
briefly detain [him] for questioning."n' Stopping a car because the
occupants are Hispanic or Latino is racial profiling, which ICE has
made clear is "something that will not be tolerated; any indication of
racial profiling will be treated with the utmost scrutiny and fully

investigated."112
The second plaintiff in the Sonoma lawsuit, Sonato-Vega, was
with his fianc6e in a parking lot when they were approached by two
Sonoma deputy sheriffs.n 3 The deputies commented that the
couple's vehicle had a broken windshield and proceeded to question
Sonato-Vega about "his immigration status, his tattoos and whether

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
287g Factsheet,supra note 63.
8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2011).
287g Factsheet,supra note 63.
Sonoma I, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
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he was a gang member." 114 Without reasonable suspicion or
consent, the deputies searched Sonato-Vega and went through the
contents of his wallet. 15 A few weeks later, the Sonoma deputies
showed up at Sonato-Vega's work and arrested him without a
warrant. 116 Like Sanchez-Lopez, Sonato-Vega was held at the
County jail for four days with no criminal charge, and did not
receive any notices of his rights before ICE picked him up.117
The third plaintiff, Medel Moyado, was arrested on August 8,
2007, for disorderly conduct.118 However, a judge told Mendel
Moyado two days later that he was free to go because no charges
had been filed.119 Nevertheless, the Sonoma Sherriff's Department
refused to release him from jail because he was being held on an
immigration detainer.120 Medel Moyado was held for a total of six
days, not 48 hours, before he was picked up by ICE. He was then
released on bond set by an immigration judge two days after ICE
took him into custody.121
In all three instances, the plaintiffs allege that Sonoma County
used the issuance of immigration detainers as justification for
keeping the plaintiffs in jail after they had been unlawfully arrested,
or in the case of Medel Moyado, after he was ordered released. In
their complaint they assert that under the detainer provisions of
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (one of the federal regulations created by DHS), local
authorities can only use immigration detainers "to retain custody
over individuals already in local custody pursuant to a valid arrest
after the person would otherwise be released from local custody."122
By contrast, the County's original argument in support of qualified
immunity was that "it was not 'clearly established' law that the
sheriff could not honor an ICE immigration detainer without an
independent basis to make an arrest."123 The County made an
analogy to California law which "recognizes acting under a facially
valid warrant to be a defense to wrongful arrests" and suggested
that "sheriffs acting pursuant to facially valid immigration holds

114. Sonoma 1,644 F. Supp 2d at 1188.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1189.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1187.
123. Sonoma II, No. C 08-4220 RS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June
11, 2010).

Winter 2012]

UNLAWFUL ARRESTS AND OVER-DETENTION

71

likewise should face no liability." 124 The main problem with this
assertion is that immigration holds are not the equivalent of arrest
warrants and do not provide probable cause that the individual is
unlawfully present in the U.S. or subject to deportation. 125 The
district court recognized the retroactive justification being asserted
by the County and held that "[e]ven if [the analogy] is correct, it
would not provide a defense to the claims that persons were stopped
without probable cause and based on racial profiling before
immigration holds were issued." 126
As of June 11, 2010, the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with
their claims for injunctive relief and damages against individual
defendants in their personal capacities. 127 However, the court held
that the Eleventh Amendment (which grants states sovereign
immunity from being sued in federal court by someone from another
state or country) barred the plaintiffs' claims against the County
defendants in their official capacities. 128
Another striking case of police making an unlawful arrest and
holding the individual exclusively on the authority of an
immigration detainer is Cote v. Lubins.129 On February 16, 2009,
twenty-three-year-old mother of three, Rita "Fany" Cote, was
arrested at her home after witnessing a domestic assault between her
sister and her sister's boyfriend.1 30 When police responded to the
911 call, Cote's sister showed the officers bruises on her neck and
pleaded with them to arrest her boyfriend. 131 However, instead of
escorting her attacker outside, the City of Taveras Police
"immediately asked everyone for identification to prove their
citizenship." 132
Cote was arrested on an outstanding civil
deportation order and taken away from her husband, Bobby, and
her three small children (all four of whom are U.S. citizens). 133 At

124. Sonoma II, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *16-17.
125. Immigration Detainers: A Comprehensive Look, IMMIGR. POL'Y CENTER (Feb. 17,
compre2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/immigration-detainers
hensive-look.
126. Sonoma II, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58110, at *17.
127. Id. at *18.
128. Id.
129. Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Cote v. Lubins, No. 5:09-cv-91Oc-10-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2009) (dismissed as moot).
130. See ACLU of FloridaDemands the Release of Illegally Detained Woman in Lake County, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/immigrantsrights/aclu-florida-demands-release-illegally-detained-woman-lake-county.
131. Id.

132. Id.
133. AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 130.
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age fifteen, "Fany's parents brought her to Florida from Honduras
without documentation." 1 34 Neither the arresting local Taveras
Police, nor the Lake County Sheriff's Office ("LCSO") responsible for
detaining Cote, were deputized under 287(g) to arrest and detain
Cote for her unlawful presence. 135 Cote was taken to the jail without
criminal charge and an immigration detainer was issued two days
later. 136 The immigration detainer expired on Friday, February 20,
2009, and Cote remained in jail over the weekend. 137 On Monday,
February 23, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") of
138
Florida filed a writ of habeas corpus demanding she be released.
"Late that night, or early the next morning, [Cote] was shackled and
driven to the side of the road where she was transferred into ICE
custody." 139 The lawsuit was 'dismissed without prejudice' on
March 26, 2009.140 However, the Cote family filed a new complaint
against the City of Taveras with a demand for a jury trial on January
25, 2011.141
B. Using Detainers to Prolong Criminal Detention
In addition to state and local LEAs using detainers to justify
incarceration after an unlawful arrest (i.e., without criminal charge),
the endemic practice of keeping individuals in jail under detainers in
142
excess of the 48-hour rule, leads to "substantially longer jail stays"
and can have "severe collateral consequences in a person's criminal
[and civil] proceedings." 1 43
A four-year study in Travis County, Texas, found that
individuals arrested for misdemeanor offenses and held on
immigration detainers remained in jail "three-and-a-half times
134. Id.

135. 287g Factsheet,supra note 63.
136. See ACLU of Florida Demands the Release of Illegally Detained Woman in Lake County, supra note 130.
137. See Lake County Sheriffs Office Investigationof ImmigrantMother's Unlawful Arrest
and Detention A White Wash, Says ACLU, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.aclufl.org/news-events?action=viewRelease&email AlertlD=3725.
138. Id.
139. See Lake County Sheriffs Office Investigation of Immigrant Mother's Unlawful Arrest
and Detention A White Wash, Says ACLU, supra note 137.
140. Judgment in a Civil Case, Cote v. Lubins, No. 5:09-cv-91-Oc-10GRJ (Mar. 26,
2009) (M.D. Fla.).
141. Docket, Cote, Rita v. City of Tavares Florida, No. 2011 CA 000220 (Apr. 5, 2011).
142. Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration Enforcement in Travis
County, Texas, IMMIGR. POL'Y CENTER at 12 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.

immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal-AlienProgram_021710.pdf.
143. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 2.
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longer" than those without detainers.144 Similarly, those charged
with felonies and subject to a detainer stayed in jail "twice as long,
on average, as non-detainer felons."145 There are a number of
reasons why this occurs. First, as we previously saw in Marcotulio's
case, some local LEAs "simply refuse to accept bond from persons
with detainers, even though they have been granted bail by a
judge." 146 In MaTCOtuliO's lawsuit against the Palm Beach County
Sheriff's Office, the "defendant's counsel has stipulated that 17 writs
of habeas petitions [all with respect to ICE detainers] were filed
against the Sheriff." 147 Additionally, noncitizens arrested for minor
infractions (such as driving without a license or misdemeanor drug
possession) usually find that an immigration detainer makes them
ineligible for many jail diversion programs such as work release,
outpatient drug rehabilitation, halfway houses, and probation. 148
Likewise, it is not unusual for "judges and prosecutors [to] assume
the presence of an ICE detainer means that a noncitizen is
undocumented and facing certain deportation" and will
automatically deny bail on that ground. 149 As a consequence,
defendants who are denied bail because of an immigration detainer
are much more likely "to plead guilty simply to get out of jail (often
times only to end up in ICE detention), regardless of the merits of
their cases or viability of defenses."150
While there are many personal hardships associated with
criminal detention prolonged by an ICE hold (loss of liberty,
separation from spouse and children, missed income, etc.) an ICE
hold can also have severe consequences on a person's unrelated civil
proceedings. In another case involving domestic violence, a mother
was arrested in Austin, Texas, after she called the police to report
that her ex-husband had attempted to hit her during an argument
over custody of their children.151 "When the police arrived, they
decided to arrest her because they found scratch marks on the man's
neck and forearm, although he had twice before faced charges of
assault and family violence."1 52 As part of the CAP program, an ICE
144. Guttin, supra note 142, at 13.
145. Id.

146. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 7-8 (besides Palm Beach, Florida,
this practice of denying bond has also been documented in Des Moines, Iowa).
147. Fla. Immigrant Coal. v. Mendez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114726, at *12 n.2 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 27, 2010).
148. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 13.
149. Id. at 10.
150. Id. at 11.
151. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 11.
152. Id.

74

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

agent permanently stationed at the Travis County jail interviewed
her and issued an ICE detainer, supposedly on the grounds that her
mother had illegally brought her into the U.S. when she was thirteen
years-old.1ss Her relatives paid a $2,000 bail for her release, not
knowing that she would continue to be held on an ICE detainer.154
After she was transferred into ICE custody, an immigration judge set
bond at $11,000 and she remained in ICE custody for two more
weeks while she raised the bond money.155 In the meantime, "her
two U.S. citizen children, an eight-year-old daughter and a six-yearold autistic son" had to remain with their abusive father. As a result
of her ICE detention, she missed the child custody hearing and her
kids were temporarily taken away from her.156

IV. Can the Agency's Policy on Immigration Detainers
Be Reformed to Eliminate State and Local Abuse?
A. ICE Draft Detainer Policy
In an attempt to address the grievances raised by the detainer
lawsuits, ICE published a new draft of its detainer policy for public
comment and discussion on August 6, 2010.157 The draft adds two
new provisions, '2.3' and '3.3', both concerning 'traffic-related
misdemeanors.'ss
Provision
2.3
defines
traffic-related
misdemeanors as, "any violation of local vehicle and traffic laws that
are not considered felonies under that jurisdiction's law."159
Provision 3.3 states, "as a general matter, immigration officers
should not issue detainers against an alien charged only with a
traffic-related misdemeanor unless or until the alien is convicted,
unless."o60 What follows is a list of six qualifiers that would allow for
the issuance of a detainer against someone arrested for a
misdemeanor traffic offense. Basically, the qualifiers are meant to
include individuals with previous criminal convictions or

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

157. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DETAINER POLICY (Draft
Aug. 6, 2010) [hereinafter ICE DRAFT DETAINER POLICY], available at http://www.

legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/DraftICE-Detainer
8-1-10.pdf.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. ICE DRAFT DETAINER POLICY, supra note 157.
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deportation orders, as well as those whose traffic-misdemeanor
involved a DUI or resulted in injury or property damage.161 The
final change in the draft (as compared to the 'Interim Policy
10074.1'162 Still in effect) is the wording at the end of provision 4.6
concerning the issuance of detainers against lawful permanent
residents (LPRs). The current policy states that "immigration
officers should exercise such authority judiciously and seek advice of
counsel for guidance if the LPR has not been convicted of a removable
offense."' 63 The new draft substitutes the words 'removable offense'
for 'criminal conviction."64
The first two provisions added to the draft detainer policy
emphasize that officers should not be issuing detainers for those
arrested for traffic-related misdemeanors, absent more serious
circumstances. However, the new draft does not acknowledge that
detainers are also being placed on individuals arrested for
misdemeanors other than traffic-related offenses, or for noncriminal
infractions like speeding, failing to yield at a stop sign, or fishing
without a license.165 For example, in 2007, the Davidson County
Sheriff's Office in Nashville, Tennessee (a 2 87(g) partner) issued 820
citations for fishing without a license, but took only twenty-nine of
those people to jail - all of whom were immigrants.166 Since
Tennessee and other states require a Social Security number to
purchase a fishing license, worth $5.50 for a one-day permit,
undocumented immigrants usually cannot buy one.16 7 Of the
twenty-nine immigrants arrested for fishing without a license, only
one third of them had "prior charges," yet nearly all of them,
twenty-five people, were put into removal proceedings.168
When 2 87(g) officers jail immigrants for noncriminal offenses
and place detainers on them, they are actually violating both ICE
detainer policy and ICE policy for Civil Immigration Enforcement:

161. Id.
162. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, INTERIM POLICY No. 10074.1,
DETAINERS [hereinafter ICE INTERIM POLICY] (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://
centerforinvestigativereporting.org/files/ICEdetainerpolicy.PDF.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. ICE DRAFT DETAINER POLICY, supra note 157, at 3.
165. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 3.

166. Chris Echegaray, Immigrants Jailed After Fishing Without a License, THE
TENNESSEAN (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://www.wbir.com/news/local/story.
aspx?storyid=131972.
167. Id.
168. Echegaray, supra note 167 (it is unclear whether any of those "prior charges"
were actually criminal convictions that could have made them removable).
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Prioritiesfor the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens.169 Both
versions of the ICE detainer policy require in provision 3.2 that
"immigration officers shall issue detainers only after an LEA has
exercised its independent authority to arrest the alien for a criminal
violation." 70 Thus, according to ICE, LEA arrests made exclusively
for civil infractions such as fishing without a license or unlawful
presence, should not trigger a detainer since they are not "criminal
Furthermore, ICE policy for Civil Immigration
violations."1 71
Enforcement states that "[t]he removal of aliens who pose a danger
to national security or a risk to public safety shall be ICE's highest
immigration priority."172 Those aliens are generally defined as
individuals who are engaged in or suspected of terrorism or
espionage; who have been convicted of violent felonies or who are
repeat criminal offenders; who are sixteen years or older and
participate in criminal gangs; or who pose a serious risk to public
safety.173 Nevertheless, it is well-documented that LEAs all across
the country, from Sonoma, California to Nashville, Tennessee, are
continuing to arrest and detain immigrants using ICE holds in direct
contravention of the agency's policies.
B. Official NGO Comments
On October 1, 2010, the American Immigration Council ("AIC")
and the Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild
("NLG"), along with twenty-five signatory institutions, published
To make
official comments on the draft detainer policy.174
immigration detainers less permeable to abuse, the comments offer
many valuable recommendations for improving the ICE detainer
policy. Most of the recommendations focus on providing clearer
standards for when and how detainers are issued. For example, to
avoid the lodging of detainers against individuals brought to jail for
noncrimnal infractions or first-time misdemeanors, the comments
advocate "requiring that an individual also be arraigned for a
criminal offense before issuing a detainer."175 This would help
discourage police from using racial profiling to "arrest individuals

169.
170.
note 162,
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

ICE Priorities, supra note 77, at 2.
ICE DRAFT DETAINER POLICY, supra note 157, at 3; ICE INTERIM POLICY, supra
at 2 (emphasis added).
Id.
ICE Priorities, supra note 77, at 1.
Id.
NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 3.
NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 15.
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on charges they never intend to pursue." 176 Additionally, the
comments recommend changing the issuance of detainers from a
post-arrest to a post-conviction model for individuals who otherwise
do not have a criminal basis for removal, such as LPRs and visa
overstays.177 The comments also stress the need for instructions on
how to challenge and lift an improvidently granted detainer. 178 This
is especially pertinent, given the increasing reliance on S-Comm and
on sub-files created by DHS in the NCIC database that are often
incomplete or erroneous.
Following Ashcroft's 2003 announcement that information
pertaining to civil removal orders was being entered into NCIC, The
Migration Policy Institute ("MPI") conducted a study to determine
the NCIC's reliability. 179 Analyzing data generated by NCIC queries
from 2002 to 2004, MPI found that state and local LEAs received
erroneous immigration hits in almost 9,000 cases, or forty-two
percent of total inquiries.180
MPI President, Demetrios
Papademetriou, commented on the disturbing results explaining
that "[t]he incredibly high number of false positives in the database
means that police resources, which are always stretched thin, are
being wasted on detaining immigrants and non-immigrants alike
who haven't done anything wrong." 181
Finally, the comments emphasize the importance of ICE
properly educating LEAs about immigration detainers and making
LEAs accountable for violations of detainer rules. 182 Since there is no
requirement for ICE to train LEAs about "the purpose and limited
scope of detainers" or about "the role and responsibilities LEAs have
regarding detainers ... confusion among LEAs is rampant, as are
violations of detainees' rights and the exposure of local jurisdictions
to costly litigation and liability."183 To establish oversight over
LEAs' detention of inmates held on immigration detainers, the
comments recommend that "ICE should review its records of when
the detainer was issued against LEA records to confirm that the
individual has not been held longer than the 48 hours permitted."184
176. Id.

177. Id. at 14.
178. Id. at 17.
179. MPI Report Shows Database Errors Plague Immigration Enforcement, GOV'T TECH.
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.govtech.com/e-government/MPI-Report-Shows-DatabaseErrors-Plague.html.
180. MPI Report Shows DatabaseErrors PlagueImmigration Enforcement, supra note 179.
181. Id.

182. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 18.
183. NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 18.
184. Id. at 19.

78

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW

JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

Furthermore, to ensure compliance with detainer regulations, the
comments insist that ICE end relationships with LEAs that abuse
detainer standards. 185
C. Why Amending ICE Policy May Not Be Enough
For LEAs who are genuinely confused about their role and
responsibilities with respect to immigration detainers, new policy
guidelines and training from ICE could be extraordinarily helpful to
eliminate state and local abuse of detainers. However, many of the
cases reviewed in this note strongly suggest that LEAs who justify
unlawful arrests on the basis of ICE detainers or who over-detain
inmates on ICE holds, do so knowingly and deliberately.
In Orleans Parish, Louisiana, two Katrina reconstruction
workers, Mario Cacho and Antonio Campo, were both held for
several months after their immigration detainers expired. 186 Each filed
repeated grievances with prison officials and made oral requests
demanding their release, but to no avail. 187 In the case of Mario
Cacho, an ICE hold was placed on him on July 31, 2009, while he
was serving a short sentence for disturbing the peace. 188 He was
scheduled to be released on August 21, 2009, and his ICE hold
expired on August 25, 2009.189 However, the prison refused to
release him and Mario remained in local custody until February 5,
2010, when his attorney filed a complaint with the Department of
Homeland Security's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
("DHS-CRCL").190 Similarly, Antonio Campo was serving time for
simple battery and was due to be released on August 12, 2009, with
an ICE hold that expired on August 16, 2009.191 Despite filing five
separate complaints inside the prison and making a plea directly to
the warden, Antonio remained in prison until November 15, 2009,
when a federal judge granted his writ of habeas corpus and ordered
him released. 192 Antonio alleges in his complaint that he "would
have remained in the Orleans Parish Sheriffs custody indefinitely if

185. Id.
186. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint at *1-3, Cacho v. Gusman, No. 2:11-cv-00225
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), available at http:// www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/
Cacho-v-Gusman-complaint.pdf.
187. Id. at *7, *9.
188. Id. at *6-7.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *7.
2
191. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint at *8, Cacho, No. 2:11-cv-002 5.
192. Id. at *9.
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he had not taken legal action to defend his rights." 193
Unfortunately, neither Mario nor Antonio's over-detention
could be characterized as an infrequent mistake. Prior to these
incidents, "Orleans Parish Sheriff Gusman ha[d] received notice on
numerous occasions that his policies and practices [were] leading to
regular instances of excessive and unlawful custody ... holding
New Orleans community members long beyond the expiration of
ICE hold requests." 194 In fact, at a meeting with concerned
community members in June 2009, "Sheriff Gusman acknowledged
that ICE hold requests do not allow him to detain an individual for
more than 48 hours after the resolution of their traffic, municipal,
and or state criminal charges." 195
Taking into account Sheriff Gusman's deliberate indifference to
DHS regulations and ICE detainer policy, it is difficult to imagine
that Orleans Parish or LEAs with a similar record of violations
would readily change their behavior if ICE reformed its policies.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 makes it abundantly clear that custody of individuals
held exclusively on detainer authority shall "not exceed 48 hours"
just as both versions of the ICE detainer policy require arrests by
LEAs for "criminal violations" before a detainer can be issued. 196
Nonetheless, many LEAs find it easy to evade these requirements,
simply because they are not enforcing immigration law directly.
Unlike 287(g) partners who are deputized "immigration officers"
and thus bound by DHS regulations and ICE standards for
enforcement activities, most LEAs who cooperate with ICE pursuant
to detainers do so informally. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), state and
local police officers are not required to enter into binding
agreements in order to communicate information about an
individual unlawfully present in the U.S. or to otherwise cooperate
with the agency in the "identification, apprehension, detention, or
removal" of such persons. 197 Furthermore, memorandums and
policies which provide "binding interpretive guidance for executive
agencies ... cannot compel state action and do not have the same
weight as an act of Congress."198

193. Id.
194. Id. at *10.
195. Id.
196. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011); ICE DRAFT DETAINER POLICY, supra note 157; ICE
INTERIM POLICY, supra note 162.

197. INA § 28 7 (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2011).
198. GARCIA & MANUEL, supra note 26, at 17 n.100.
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V. Why the Federal Government Has a Compelling
Interest to Eliminate State and Local
Abuse of Immigration Detainers by
Amending 8 U.S.C. § 1357
The success of ICE programs to identify, apprehend and remove
dangerous criminal aliens greatly hinges on the agency's
cooperation with state and local LEAs. However, in order to
accomplish this important objective, the federal government cannot
turn a blind eye to unlawful arrests and over-detentions by LEAs
who claim that current law exonerates these practices. Despite
increased reliance on the courts to address detainer violations
through habeas petitions and federal lawsuits, "civil litigation to
address detainer violations is not an effective education and
accountability strategy for ensuring LEA compliance with detainer
regulations and policies."199 For years, legal scholars and civil rights
advocates have complained that the statutory authority for
immigration detainers, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d), Detainer of aliens for
violations of controlled substance laws, does not sanction the type of
enforcement activities carried out by ICE and its local partners. 200
Section (d) states:
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local
law enforcement official for a violation of any law relating to
controlled substances ... the officer or employee of the Service shall
promptly determine whether or not to issue such a detainer. If
such a detainer is issued and the alien is not otherwise detained by
shall
Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney General
effectively and expeditiously take custody of the alien. 201
In Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of
Sonoma, the plaintiffs argued that language of § 1357(d) limits the
authority of ICE to issue detainers only for noncitizens who have
been arrested for drug related offenses. 202 However, the district
court disagreed, finding that the agency's interpretation of the
statute (codified in 8 C.F.R. § 287.7) authorizing the issuance of
immigration detainers for any alien in police custody suspected of

199.
200.
201.
202.

NGO DETAINER COMMENTS, supra note 17, at 9.
Lasch, supra note 73, at 191.
8 U.S.C. § 135 7 (g)(10) (emphasis added).
Sonoma 1,644 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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being removable "is a permissible construction of the statute." 203
The court construed "the language of § 1357 as simply placing
special requirements on officials issuing detainers for a violation of
any law relating to controlled substances" rather than limiting the
use of immigration detainers strictly to drug offenders. 204
The other major issue regarding the statutory authority for
immigration detainers under § 1357(d) is that it fails to consider the
role state and local LEAs have in the process. Instead, Congress was
definitively silent on the issue, preferring to let DHS and ICE
determine exactly how state and local police would be involved in
the detainer process. However, when LEAs, such as the Palm Beach
County Sheriff's Office in Florida, the Orleans Parish in Louisiana, or
the Sonoma County Sheriff's Office in California, systematically use
the issuance of immigration detainers to justify unlawful arrests or
prolonged detentions in violation of DHS regulations and ICE
policy, the agency is put in a very difficult spot. Given that these
LEAs have not been deputized and trained under § 13 57(g) as
"immigration officers," they are not bound by agency rules. As the
NGO Detainer Comments suggest, ICE could simply choose to
terminate its informal relationship with the violative LEAs and
refrain from lodging detainers against persons in their custody.
However, this is not a very appealing option for the agency, given its
heavy reliance on cooperation with state and local LEAs through
2 8 7(g), Secure Communities, and the Criminal Alien Program.
Alternatively, Congress could strengthen the ability of DHS and
ICE to deter state and local police abuse of immigration detainers by
adding the following language to § 1357(d): "Any state or local law
enforcement agency that cooperates with the Department of
Homeland Security in the lodging or execution of immigration
detainers shall abide by the standards for enforcement activities
created by the agency." By clarifying this obligation in the statute,
DHS and ICE will be in a better position to enforce agency
regulations and policies that preserve constitutional rights against
unlawful arrest and over-detention, when an express cooperation
agreement with the LEA is absent.
There is no question that the federal government has a strong
interest in maintaining the integrity of our law enforcement agencies
and assuring that noncitizens are treated with fairness and dignity.
While the government certainly faces real security challenges with
respect to "dangerous criminal aliens" identified at the top of its
203. Id.
204. Id.
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enforcement priorities, there is substantial evidence to show that the

majority of non-citizens being over-detained by LEAs on ICE holds
do not fit this description. Finally, given that approximately threequarters of a million immigrants become naturalized U.S. citizens
every year, 205 we must keep in mind that today's immigrants are
indeed, tomorrow's citizens.

205. See Naturalization Fact Sheet, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES (Sept. 17,
2010), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141765
43f6dla/?vgnextoid=b62aef6b56clb2lOVgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=
68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD.

